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ABSTRACT 
It is agreed that the degree of association between the 
presidential and congressional election results is an important 
"Constitutional" variable. But the significance of this association 
depends on whether it is due to extraneous forces or to the personal 
attractiveness of the president. In this paper we give a statistical 
basis for determining the dependence of the vote for members of the 
House on the attractiveness of the presidential candidate. Further, 
it is shown that their dependence has decreased rather sharply and 
is currently at a historical low point. 
PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Because of their fear that tyrannical majorites would act 
impetuously (and in spite of Hamilton's counsel in Federalist #22, 
to avoid giving a minority a check on the majority), the founding 
fathers imposed constitutional requirements for extraordinary majorities 
in order to enact legislation. And if these constitutional requirements 
were not sufficient to prevent the enactment of ill-considered laws, 
successive congresses have in effect imposed even more stringent 
requirements on the formation majorities through the development of the 
committee systems and various other aspects of the legislative process. 
Indeed the American system of government has gone very far in putting 
"ambition against ambition" for the purpose of enforcing a gradual and 
deliberate legislative process. 
In fact, most observers would probably agree that the only 
ways that durable positive legislative majorities (i.e. ones that can 
enact rather than merely block legislation) can be formed is through 
the actions of the leaders of majority party together with the president. 
To be sure, the president if often of the majority party and, when he 
is, is usually its effective leader; much of the time, then, the cohesive 
forces in American politics are in a single pair of hands. For the most 
part the present discussion shall be concerned with the president as 
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the one constitutional figure who is most interested in building and 
maintaining legislative majorities. But whether these cohesive forces 
are unified or not, there is strong evidence that their strength is 
decreasing at a measureable rate and that the fundamentally 
immobile character of the American constitution is becoming more 
and more dominant. 
To the extent that leaders of the majority party have ever 
been able to develop and maintain the extraordinary majorities required 
for legislation in the American system, they have done so by shaping 
the incentives of a large number of members of Congress in such a way 
that each found it in his or her own interest to act in the way that 
party leaders found desirable. This has never been a simple task in 
our system and we reserve a special place in our mythology (and our 
text books) for those leaders who have succeeded in this activity 
even for a short time. The honor roll of presidents is short but 
familiar: Wilson in his first year, Roosevelt's hundred days, Johnson 
during the pre-Vietnam period. Less well known but perhaps more 
impressive were such party leaders as Speaker Reed who was able to make 
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use of much more limited resources in building and maintaining legislative 
majorities. 
Of course, one reason we honor those of our leaders who have 
been able to overcome the constitutional reluctance to act is that it is 
very difficult under most circumstances to convince any substantial body 
of legislators that they have a common interest in accomplishing a 
particular legislative program. But if there is one way to produce the 
appropriate incentives, it is by exploiting the fact that most 
congressmen wish to be re-elected. And so those leaders who have 
succeeded in maintaining programmatic coalitions in the Congress 
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have usually done so by convincing their colleagues on Capitol Hill 
that the success of a legislative program would improve their chances 
to obtain their goals. 
The ability of a president (or a party leader) to convince 
his congressional peers that their electoral fates turn on his 
success in off ice depends crucially on the anticipated behavior of 
the electorate. In this sense, a very real part of the "effective 
constitution" (as apart from the written document) of American 
politics resides in the heads of the voters. To the extent that 
voters base their voting decisions for members of Congress on similar 
criteria to those they use in making their vote decision for 
president, .2!.• base their congressional vote directly on their 
presidential vote, they tie the interests of the member of Congress to 
that of the president and thereby enable him to assemble relatively 
durable legislative coalitions. Here we shall show that the 
tendency of the electorate to associate the presidential and 
congressional vote is an important constitutional variable. It can 
exercise a major effect not only on the incentives facing members of 
Congress but also helps to determine who is sitting in Congress and 
who will therefore decide the fate of the president's legislative 
program. 
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In this paper we examine a part of what we have called the 
effective constitution. We utilize aggregate election returns for the 
post-Civil War period to determine the degree to which voters have 
been willing to associate their presidential and congressional votes. 
In part II we introduce a simple model of vote determination that 
enables us to measure the strength of what we may call presidential 
coattails and to disaggregate it into two components: the behavioral 
propensity to associate the congressional and presidential vote; and, 
the way in which the aggregate vote for a major party for the House of 
Representatives is translated into seats in that House. We separate 
the aggregate data into periods corresponding roughly to what have been 
called party systems and show that there has been a dramatic change in 
the extent to which voters have connected their votes for Congress and 
the president. 
In section III we introduce a more sophisticated model of vote 
determination � one closely related to the model developed by Kramer 
in his seminal article on the effect of short run economic fluctuations 
on the vote for Congress [1971]. While there are rather severe 
limitations in the number of observations available for this analysis 
we are able to produce results that are similar to those in section II 
under quite different specifications. Furthermore these results are 
shown to be fairly insensitive to various aspects of model 
specification. Section IV contains a discussion of the results. 
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II· A SIMPLE MODEL THAT PERMITS THE ESTIMATION OF PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS 
In this paper we shall distinguish two ways in which citizens 
might determine their congressional vote during presidential 
elections. A citizen might make a determination of how to cast his or 
her vote for president by utilizing information about the candidates 
as well as his or her own partisan preferences and then make the 
congressional vote decision depend directly on that prior decision. 
In this model -- the pure coattail vote model -- the ith citizen's voting 
decision for the House candidate could be written as follows 
(1) Hi CJ. + BPi +S i 
where Hi is the vote for House candidate 
pi is the vote for Presidential candidate 
and Si are the unmeasured influences that affect the 
citizen's decision. 
For convenience we might think of Hi and pi as coded either l (for 
Democratic) or 0 (for Republican) with nonvoters eliminated from the 
� 
analysis. We shall interpret B as the estimated (behavioral) 
propensity for the citizen to associate his or her vote for representative 
to the vote for president. 
A second model -- which we shall entitle the simultaneous 
determination model (SDM) -- has the characteristic that there is a 
i i i i list of measured variables, labeled x • (x1, x2, • • •  , xm) which may 
enter into the determination of either the vote for the president or 
the vote for the House. It could be written as follows 
(2) H
i 
(3) p
i 
m H i i i a.
H 
+ l B.x. + s; +I'll 
j=l J J 
m P i i i a.p + l 8.x. + s + 11 
j=l J J 
p 
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where ni is an unmeasured variable standing for the president's personal 
attractiveness as distinct from the relative attractiveness of his 
record, his issue stands, or whatever else might go into the xi vector. 
y is the proportion of that presidential attractiveness that carries 
directly over to the House candidate would constitute the president's 
coattail vote. i i Once again s; and Sp stand for forces that are 
outside the model. 
In this paper we shall remain agnostic as to which of these 
models constitutes a better representation of voter decision 
processes. We shall work with both and claim that if they give 
qualitatively similar results we should be satisfied that the choice 
of a model of vote determination is immaterial to the basic conclusion 
of the paper. 
A presidential candidate's coattail influence on the 
distribution of House seats can be written as follows 
(4) S H t 
H P 1 
al 
+ B1Yt + v 
where H S.t: is the proportion of House seats held at times .t by 
members of the presidential candidate's party of those 
seats held by one of the two major parties 
yi: proportion of the two party vote for president received 
by the presidential candidate 
In equation (4) 131 will constitute a measure of "responsiveness" or 
the degree to which the vote received by the presidential candidates 
translates into House seats for his party. 
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As long as the influence of y� on S� is through y�, 131 in equation 
(4) is decomposable into 132 x 133 where 132 and 133 may be written as follows 
(5) 
and 
(6) 
H H 2 s.t = a2 + 132y.t + v 
H p y .t = a3 + l33Y .t + v3 
where � is the proportion of the two party vote for the House 
received by the party of the presidential candidate . 
In this case 132 is an estimate of the rate at which the vote 
for the House translates into seats (or, what is sometimes called the 
swing ratio) and B3 is an estimate of what we have termed the 
behavioral propensity of voters to associate their congressional vote 
with their presidential vote. 
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TABLE 1 
DECOMPOSITION OF THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE 
COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE TO FLUCTUATIONS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE* 
Period Behavioral Connection Between Vote Swing Responsiveness 
for President and vote for Congress Ratio 
133 132 
131 132x
l33 
1868-1896 
• 95 4.40 4.17 (4.18) 
1900-1928 .57 1. 95 1.13** (1.11) 
1932-1944 
• 81 3.20 2.60 (2.51) 
1948-1964 .37 2.40 • 70 (0. 89) 
1968-1976 .19 2.02 .56 (0.38) 
* Except for the postwar WWII period all correleations are above .9. 
** Note that if 1912 is omitted, the responsiveness estimate drops to .77, 
and the swing ratio to 1.41. The behavioral connection remains at .57. 
In Table 1 we report estimates of the parameters of equations 
(4) to (6) for the periods 1868-1896, 1900-1928, 1932-1944, 1948-1964, 
and 1968-1976. The first period constitutes a useful benchmark for 
assessing the coefficients because the use of partisan ballots had the 
effect of making split ticket voting extremely difficult and therefore 
quite rare. In a sense the institutions associated with the ballot 
box in the postbellum period ensured a close connection between the 
presidential and congressional votes. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that 133 for this period is nearly l.O. What is remarkable 
is that the New Deal period witnessed a return of this coefficient to 
.81 � fairly near its pre-1900 peak-even though in this period the 
locus of the connection between the presidential and congressional 
vote was to be found in the discretionary behavior of the electorate. 
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In fact there is considerable variability in the estimates of S3 which 
suggests that voters in different political climates found it useful to 
relate their congressional and presidential votes in different manners. 
On the other hand the swing ratios Cs2) show somewhat less 
variation than might have been expected. As Tufte [1973] reported, this 
ratio was quite high before the turn of the century and fell off to 
approximately its present level of 2.0 during the 1900-1928 period. 
It returned temporarily to half its postbellum level during the New 
Deal period but has regressed during the post World War Two period. 
Interestingly, the. current low level of responsiveness appears 
to be due more to the abysmal level of the behavioral connection than 
to the swing ratio. This measure, while it is known to be somewhat 
sensitive to the number of competitive congressional seats, has not 
declined substantially during the post war period while responsiveness 
continues to seek new depths. Perhaps the fact that the swing ratio 
responds to other things (such as retirements) than the proportion of 
competitive seats has conspired to keep it at an artificially high 
level. In this case we might warn future presidential aspirants to 
expect still further drops in responsiveness so that, if the 
speculations put forward in the introduction are valid, still less 
cooperation from Congress may be in prospect for White House 
residents. 
The reader may object to the fact that very small number of 
observations enter into the regressions reported in Table 1, or 
to the model which formed the basis for these estimates. If 
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citizens decide how to vote both in House races and presidential 
contests by making direct use of such variables as party 
identification or performance evaluations of the incumbent president 
then the coattail estimates produced by the present model might be 
exaggerated. The reason for this is that fluctuations in a variable 
such as aggregate economic performance will in the present formulation 
only be able to influence the house vote through its impact on 
presidential voting. Thus if this variable has an impact on both the 
presidential and congressional vote it will appear as an increased 
behavioral propensity or as a coattail vote. 
On the other hand, our interest here has been in the fluctuations 
of these estimates from one period to another and not in the absolute 
magnitudes of the coattail estimates. And it may be that from this 
standpoint the present model -- which has the virtue of consuming very 
few degrees of freedom in its estimation -- may give adequate 
information. In the next section we estimate a more sophisticated 
model of vote determination -- one which allows for performance 
evaluations and partisan affiliations to directly enter into the 
voting decisions for contests at the presidential and congressional 
level -- and we obtain similar qualitative results to those reported 
here. 
III. ESTIMATION OF THE COATTAILS VOTE USING THE SIMULTANEOUS
DETERMINATION MODEL 
Kramer estimated several special cases of what we have called 
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the simultaneous determination model, for the period from 1896-1964. 
It is written as follows: 
(7) 
(8) 
H m 
Yt = � + I 
j=l 
H H Sjxjt + 
ut + yvt
p m p p 
Yt = � + l S .x. t + ut + vt 
j=l J J 
where xlt• • •Xmt are variables which enter into the evaluation of the 
candidate of the incumbent party. In recent literature past economic 
performance, and presidential popularity have been employed as right 
hand side variables in these equations as have variables like 
incumbency status or time. 
H P Yt and Yt are the incumbent party 
percentage of the two party vote for the House and the President 
H P 
respectively, u tand u tare disturbances, and vt is an
 unmeasured 
variable representing the relative personal attractiveness of the 
presidential candidate of the incumbent party. The exogenous variables 
utilized by Kramer include percent change in per capita monetary income, 
percent change in the price level, and change in unemployment (all 
changes were measured during the election year). In addition, he employed 
a trend term and a dummy variable for the incumbency of the president. 
For purposes of estimation, Kramer that S� = S� for all j and that 
J J 
p H ut • ut for all t. While Lepper (19741 has subsequently provided some 
evidence which suggests that the first of these assumptions may be 
unwarranted (and certainly contemporary cross-sectional survey 
evidence supports Lepper's conclusion as well; Fiorina, 1979; Kinder 
and Kiewiet 1979), his second assumption has not yet been subjected to 
critical scrutiny. 
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For our purposes the most interesting of Kramer's results were 
those relating to what he called the coattails effect, y. He reported 
coattail voting estimates of 0, .20, and .30 depending on the particular 
specification employed. The higher estimates are obtained when a trend 
term is included. Even when a nonzero estimate was obtained, likelihood 
ratio tests indicated that one could not reject the hypothesis that y = 0. 
In the present section we estimate the coattails effect within 
various subperiods and under various model specifications within the 
class of simultaneous determination models. We show that, not 
surprisingly, Kramer's assumption that the distrubances in equations (7) 
and (8) are perfectly correlated has the effect of minimizing the 
estimated coattail effect within this class of models. Even so, within 
some periods the coattail estimates under this specification are 
significantly nonzero. And, no matter which specification is employed, 
similar qualitative results emerge. 
As did Kramer, we employed a maximum likelihood method to 
estimate the model parameters. p H We assume that u t and u t are 
distributed according to a bivariate normal distribution with means 
equal to zero, and the following variance � covariance matrix: 
I 
[ 2 2]a po 
pa2 a2 
In this case if we write 
(9) H p Yt - YYt 
H P � H P  H P  (a -ya.)+ L CS.-yS.)x.t + ut-Yut 
j=l J J 
l. 
H P we know that ut - yut is normally 
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distributed with mean zero and 
2 2 variance e�ual to a (l+y -2yP) • If we assume, as Kramer did, that p -
then 
B� 
J 
(10) 
this variance is equal to (l-y)2a2. And if as Kramer assumed
p B. = B. for each j then (9) can be written as 
J J 
H P 
Yt - YYt 
1-y 
a.H p ya. 
1-y 
m 
+ l B
.
x
. t + ut 
j=l J J. 
In this special case Kramer was able to obtain maximum likelihood 
estimates of all the model parameters. 
But the assumption that u� • u� seems to us to be quite 
strong. It means that the forces which are left out of the vote 
determination equation for the House races are exactly the same as 
those left out of the presidential vote equation. We would prefer to 
leave open the possibility that the forces left out of the two 
equations may not be identical. 
Equations (7) and (8) are an example of Zellner's "seemingly 
unrelated regressions" model [see Goldberger, 1964, PP• 246-248]; in that 
model the estimates of B� and B� are identical to the OLS estimates. 
J J 
If we assume that v is uncorrelated with u
H and up, the estimated 
between-equations covariance matrix for the total disturbances in equations 
(7) and (8) can be written as follows: 
2 2 2 a + y av 
2 2 po + ycrv 
2 2 po + ycrv 
2 2 a + a v 
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where cr2 is the variance of the presidential voting equation's separate v 
disturbance term. Since this model is underidentified we cannot 
simultaneously obtain estimates of all the model parameters. However, 
it is possible to determine the sensitivity of the maximum likelihood 
estimates of y(p) to variations in p by maximizing the equation's likelihood 
function for various fixed values of p. Thus, even though a point estimate 
of y is not obtainable, we can estil!late the range of y(p) and if this range 
is sufficiently small we will have learned something about the coattail 
effect. Our procedure, than, was to find the maximum and minimum values 
of y that are obtained by varying p between -1 and 1 .  
It's useful to begin the analysis by showing how the SDM fits 
over the whole period from 1896 to 1976 for two cases: in Model I the 
right hand side variables are percent change in real per capita GNP (in 
the year preceding the election) Rt, and Nt, the "normal" vote of the 
party which holds the Presidency; the coefficient on Nt is restricted to 
be equal to 1.0. In Model II the same right hand side variables are 
used but the coefficient on Nt is unrestricted. The normal vote employed 
here is simply the average of the two party vote for the House over the 
previous three congressional elections and Rt is constructed from the 
NBER-Kendrich GNP Series before 1908 and the BEA GNP Series after that 
[see Long Term Economic Growth, 1860-1970, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
and Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1975, U. S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1975]. Table 2 reports the approximate maximum likelihood range 
estimates of y for the two models. 
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TABLE 2 
ESTIMATES OF THE COATTAIL VOTE IN TWO SIMULTANEOUS DETERMINATION MODELS 
Model I Model II 
Minimum value of Y .19 .25 
Maximum value of y .53 • 55 
The minimum v alues of Y are obtained by employing Kramer's 
assumption that p • l. O. The maximum values of Y (which are 
significantly different from zero at the .01 level) are achieved when 
we assume that that p • -1. While it is not surprising that y 
varies inversely with p , it is interesting that the range of values 
that the coattail parameter assumes is fairly small relative to the 
range of assumptions we entertain about possible values for p. 
While it is informative that the range of y(p) is relatively 
small, it is also useful to see that y(p) is quite insensitive to 
changes in p for p less than .5. Above that level y(p) drops fairly 
rapidly as p increases. For example, if p lies between -1 and .5, 
the range of Y(p) is • 41 to • 53 for Model I and • 46 to • 55 for Model 
II, while the range of Y(p) for p between .5 and 1.0 is .19 to .41 for 
Model I and .25 to .46 for Model II. This suggests that if Kramer's 
hypothesis that p • 1 is off by a small amount the true value of Y 
could be substantially higher than the ones he reports. 
We can also examine the estimates of the impact of the percent 
change in real per capita income on the vote for the incumbent party 
H P 
under the hypothesis that S • S • In this case estimates of the parameters 
and their standard errors may be obtained by Kramer's method. We found that, 
16 
under Kramer's assumption ( p • 1.0), models I and II both yield 
estimates of the effect of change in real per capita GNP of 
approximately .315 with standard errors of less than .15. If, on the 
other hand p • -1, then both estimates are approximately about .15 with 
standard errors of .12 and .22 • 
We are, of course, primarily interested in the statistical 
analysis within electoral periods or "party systems." For the present 
we confine ourselves to three such periods: 1896-1928, 1932-1948, and 
1952-1976. The small number of available observations restricts the 
number of exogenous variables that can be employed so that as above we 
estimate only Models I (with Rt and Nt as exogenous variables and the 
coefficient on Nt restricted to be equal to 1.0.) and II (which has no 
restrictions on the parameters associated with Rt and Nt>• While 
these models are quite simple they yield estimates which are mutually 
consistent and which fit well with other information and with the 
results of the previous section. Thus, in spite of the small number 
of observations we feel fairly confident that the estimates of the 
coattail parameter within electoral regimes are informative and that 
they provide a useful perspective on changes in the relationship 
between the vote for Congress and the vote for the president. 
In Table 3 we present estimates for both Model I and Model II 
of the maximum and minimum value of y within each electoral period. 
TABLE 3 
THE RANGE OF THE COATTAIL PARAMETER WITHIN ELECTORAL PERIOD 
FOR MODELS I AND II* 
Model I Model II 
1896-1928 .49 - • 66 .39 • 61
1932-1948 1.30 - 3.64 .01 - .67 
1952-1976 • 03 - .11 .09 - .16 
* Entries are the maximum and minimum values 
of y which can be obtained by varying the 
choice of p between -1 and I. 
Evidently no matter which model is employed the coattail 
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estimates are quite narrowly constrained in both the 1896-1928 and 
1952-1976 periods. On the other hand, the estimated range for the New
Deal period is quite wide for Model II and is implausible for Model I. 
Inspection of the residuals in this period indicates that not only is 
the correlation between R,t and the vote for the candidates 
(congressional or presidential) of the incumbent party so high that 
P H relatively little variation remains in v-t + u-t or in Yv-t+ u-t but the 
correlation between these two residuals exceeds .95. Thus, the the 
estimate of Y is very sensitive to assumptions about these residuals 
and in particular to the choice of p. It is of some interest to 
describe in somewhat more detail for Model II the form of the 
relationship between the assumed value of p and the estimate of Y 
during the 1932-1948 period. We discovered that the low values of Y 
are not at all robust to a departure of p from the value of 1. 0. 
Indeed, if p takes on value below .5, then the estimate of Y will
exceed .5, In other words only if Kramer's assumption about the true 
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value of p is nearly correct, can we conclude that the coattail effect 
during the New Deal period was small. Otherwise it appears to have 
been quite substantial. 
Even though we suspect that the coattails effect in the New 
Deal period was large, this suspicion rests on a belief that p is 
not near l; because this belief cannot be examined with the data at hand, 
we choose to set the estimates for the New Deal period aside for the 
present and focus on the periods in which the present technique yields 
more clearcut results. 
Because the range estimates are relatively small in the 1896-
1928 and the 1952-1976 periods, we can conclude that the coattail 
parameter has exhibited a rather sharp decline over time. And this 
conclusion appears to be robust against the variations in model 
specification examined in this section. Furthermore, and perhaps even 
more impressive is the fact that this conclusion -- that coattail 
voting has shown a dramatic decline -- agrees with the analysis of the 
previous section which was based on a totally different sort of model 
altogether. We should say, however, that the simultaneous 
determination models yield even lower responsiveness estimates in the 
present period than those given in the previous section. 
It may be of some interest that in both these periods, no 
matter which specification is employed, the effect of percent change 
in real per capita income on the vote for the incumbent president's 
party at either the presidential or House level is insignificant. 
However, as noted before, the estimated effect of this variable is 
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always greater at the presidential level. Perhaps the very small 
number of observations within each period produces imprecise estimates 
or perhaps, following Bloom and Price [1975] the form of the 
relationship should be recast. We cannot say. We content ourselves 
with the observation that, in spite of the small amount of data, the 
estimates of the coattails parameter are sufficiently precise to 
justify an unambiguous conclusion. 
IV. DISCUSSION
The results reported here, especially those reported in 
section III, will be convincing only if the reader is convinced that 
Kramer's hypothesis that p • 1 is implausible. And, we must admit, no 
evidence has been presented in this paper which would bear directly on 
this proposition. If one wants to believe that p is very high then 
one may (continue to) believe that coattail voting was never very 
widespread and that no perceptible decline in its incidence 
has occurred. This conclusion, while it is consistent with one way of 
interpreting these data, seems quite wrong to us and so we have tried 
to come up with some evidence as to the likely size of p. 
The reader may have noticed that Model I in section III is 
identical to the model of vote determination introduced by Tufte in his 
book., ·Political Control of the Economy 11978, p. 119-122] except that 
he employed an explicit measure of the attractiveness of the incumbent 
presidential candidate. He utilized the open-ended candidate codes 
found in the ICPSR election studies to construct a variable that 
indexed the net personal popularity of the presidential candidate of 
the incumbent party. By employing this variable in place of v, we 
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were able to re-estimate Model I for the 1952-1976 period. Again, the 
model is an example of Zellner's "seemingly unrelated regression" model, 
so that we could obtain estimates of SH, SP, and y directly by employing 
OLS on equations (7) and (8) under Tufte's hypothesis that the coefficient 
on Nt was equal to 1.0 in both equations. An estimate of p was found 
by correlating the residuals of the two equations. 
Our results are similar to those reported by Tufte; 
differences are primarily due to the fact that we employed a different 
period (starting in 1952 rather than 1948) and used somewhat different 
measures of Rt and Nt• For present purposes the parameter estimates 
of Y and P are of most interest. The estimate of Y turned out to be 
.167 with a standard error of .12 �not too different from the 
estimates reported above for the period from 1952 to 1976. The estimate 
of P was -.53. Thus there is some evidence that the disturbances 
in the two equations are actually negatively correlated during the 
recent period• 
Its also of some interest to note that the estimated impact of 
the percent change in real per capita income on the vote for the 
presidential candidate of the incumbent party was 1.11 (with standard 
error of .67) while the corresponding coefficient in House vote 
equation was . 054 (with the standard error, .34). 
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While we hesitate to draw too broad conclusions from the 
present analysis, it does seem likely that in the present period, at 
least, the disturbances in the presidential and congressional vote 
equations do not exhibit the strong positive correlation that is 
required if one wants to accept the smaller estimates of Y. If we 
employ the assumption that p is nonpositive in interpreting the 
estimates obtained in section III, the implied coattail estimate is 
no greater than . 16 for the 1952-1976 period under either Model I or II. 
And, if we believe that the true value of p for the New Deal period 
(during which our estimates of Y were particularly sensitive to the 
value o� p) is actually less than, say, .s, then the implied estimate 
of Y for this period (using Model II) would be at least .5. And in 
this case we could reasonably conclude that the decline in coattail 
voting has only only been substantial but that it has also been or 
rather recent phenomenon. 
For the most part we have concerned ourselves with showing 
that, for a variety of plausible models of vote determination, the 
tendency of voters to connect their presidential and congressional 
votes has undergone a rather recent and substantial decline. We 
should like to point out, in addition, that the present evidence 
suggests that the decline in the responsiveness of the party 
composition of Congress to the presidential vote depends much more 
directly on this behavioral connection than on the swing ratio. 
Indeed, comparing the 1896-1928 period with the present one, (in 
section II) the swing ratio remained at approximately 2.0 while the 
behavioral connection (or in the terminology of section III, the 
coattails effect) exhibited a rather sharp decline. This conclusion 
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stands in contrast with that advanced by Jacobson [--�] who recently 
argued that because of the decline in the number of competitive seats 
in the House of Representatives, 
• • • relatively substantial changes in the distribution 
of popular forces - brought about by coattail or by other 
forces - may not be reflected in changes in party strength 
in the House. [p. 6] 
We think that there is little evidence for this proposition in our 
data or, indeed, elsewhere. The swing ratio simply hasn't varied as 
much as the behavioral connection and will not account for the 
declining responsiveness of the composition of the House to 
presidential level for electoral forces. 
The ability of American government to overcome the immobilist 
tendencies of the constitutional system has traditionally depended 
on the anticipated behavior of the electorate. As long as voters 
collectively exhibited a tendency to connect presidential electoral 
majorities to those of their congressional co-partisans (and as long 
as political actors believed that they did so), the winner of the 
presidential race tended to bring with him to the Congress a 
substantial majority of his own party, and, further, members of 
Congress of his party had some incentive to see him succeed with his 
legislative program. The evidence presented here suggests that this 
tendency has diminished so substantially that an incoming president 
cannot routinely expect either to have a majority of his party in both 
the House and Senate or that members of his own party will believe 
that their electoral fates depend very much on his success in office. 
While our argument is based on aggregate national returns, it 
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is congruent with results obtained from the analysis of cross-
sec tional data on congressional districts. Burnham found, for 
example, that the number of congressional districts which elected a 
representative of one party while delivering a plurality to the 
presidential candidate of another party, underwent a tenfold increase 
in the 1920-1972 period (1975] . Using successive cross sections over 
the 1952-1976, Edwards [1980] discovered that the plurality of the 
presidential candidate has had a decreasing effect on the probability 
with which his congressional running mates are re-elected. Indeed, he 
reports that in both 1972 and 1976 there was no significant impact at 
all after controlling for the normal level of party strength in a 
district. 
To be sure Burnham's results as well as those reported by 
Edwards relate more to what we have called responsiveness than to the 
But behavioral connection between the House and presidential votes. 
they combine with our work to convey a substantially unified 
impression: House members need have less fear of the national 
electoral tides associated with a presidential race than they have 
ever had before. 
The Constitutional system has in our view been profoundly 
altered. The behavioral basis of that system, a basis located in the 
beliefs and evaluations of the electorate, appears to have shifted so 
far that the principle cohesive forces in American national politics 
have been measurably weakened. And with this weakening, the capacity 
of the political system to act as an instrument to restructure social 
and economic reality may have been eroded. 
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